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2 Fight Crime: Invest in Kids
Too many juveniles are becoming chronic, violent offenders. Nothing will make juvenile
crime disappear. But solid research from Missouri, Ohio and elsewhere shows that the
reforms beginning to happen across America can eliminate 4 out of 10 or more of the
repeat crimes now committed by juvenile offenders. 
What Research Shows
Punishment alone will not be enough to make our streets safer. Research has identified sever-
al effective interventions that can keep young offenders from committing further crimes.
Here’s what is needed:
1.  The most serious and troubled young offenders in custody need effective interven-
tions to become productive citizens instead of career criminals.
Missouri found that moving teens who need confinement from large institutions to smaller
facilities and helping them learn to control their anti-social behaviors, could cut reconvic-
tion rates within three years of release to 40 percent below the rates experienced, for
example, by New York State.
In Wisconsin, seriously troubled young offenders who did not receive a specialized mental
health intervention while in custody were three times more likely than similar youth to
commit violent crimes when released. 
Chicago found that, when its most dangerous violent offenders returned home after serving
their sentence, a carrot-and-stick program helped cut homicides in their high-crime neigh-
borhoods by almost 40 percent.This approach combines increased law enforcement super-
vision of the offenders, expedited return to custody if needed, community pressure, and
expedited access to jobs, substance abuse treatment or other services. The same approach
has worked with juveniles in Boston, Philadelphia and a number of other cities.
2.  Use intensive foster care as an alternative to lock-up for less-dangerous offenders.
Many offenders who are in lower-security lock-up would re-offend less if placed in inten-
sive foster care. Strict, specially-trained, foster parents ensure these medium-risk teens
learn how to avoid criminal behavior while their parents are being trained to use the same
methods to keep their children on track and away from crime when they leave foster care
and return home. Research shows this approach can cut new crimes in half. 
3.  Use community sanctions that include effective interventions as an alternative to
out-of-home placement for many youth.
Many young delinquents committing serious or repeated crimes may not need placement
outside the home.  Along with the typical sanctions the courts are likely to impose on them,
such as probation, curfews, and community service, if the troubled youth receive proven
interventions, such as Cognitive Behavioral Therapy and Family Therapy, they can effective-
ly change their negative patterns of behavior. As a result, the youth can be diverted from
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expensive custody and still commit fewer new crimes than if they are placed in custody. These approaches, begin-
ning to be used throughout America, teach young offenders the social skills they need to sharply reduce further
aggression, substance abuse or other criminal behavior. 
4.  Reduce detention before adjudication for low-risk juvenile offenders.
Data show that, nationwide, six out of ten teens brought before courts are unlikely ever to return on new charges,
yet many of them wind up being held in detention before their court hearings. One way to help finance interven-
tions for more serious or chronic juvenile offenders is to reduce the unnecessary – and expensive – warehousing
of low-risk young offenders in detention before their adjudication. This can be accomplished by using evidence-
based screening tools coupled with alternative interventions. 
5.  Collect data and increase accountability.
Florida and Washington State are models for how states can systematically collect data on juvenile and adult re-
offending and use data to increase accountability. The federal government should encourage more states to follow
their lead.
Save Money by Cutting Crime 
An analysis from Washington State shows that research-based approaches for cutting aggression and substance
abuse among juvenile offenders can save from $15,000 to $75,000 per offender from reduced custody and repeat
crime costs. When RECLAIM Ohio redirected moderate-risk juvenile offenders to community sanctions and interven-
tions programs, instead of custody, it cut custody and repeat crime costs so much it saved from $48,000 to $74,000
per offender. 
Making America Safer
The 3,500 members of Fight Crime: Invest in Kids are convinced change is necessary. They are discouraged by hav-
ing to arrest a few kids over and over again. They recommend that federal policy leverage state and local efforts to
implement these effective reforms. The most important message is probably the simplest: use science, data collection,
and accountability to guide policy. The members of Fight Crime: Invest in Kids know that using what works with juve-
nile offenders will produce both huge savings and safer streets.
1212 New York Ave. NW • Washington, DC 20005 • 202.776.0027 • Fax 202.776.0110
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Introduction
Fight Crime: Invest in Kids is an anti-crime organiza-
tion led by more than 3,500 law enforcement leaders –
chiefs, sheriffs and prosecutors – and survivors of crime.
Most of the survivors are parents of murdered children. 
Crime requires punishment. Punishment may be plac-
ing a young offender in custody, or, depending on the
crime, imposing a range of other tough sanctions. The
bottom line is that residents must be safe walking the
streets. Research shows, however, that punishment alone
will often not be enough; troubled teens will need help
to stop their aggression, substance abuse, or other anti-
social behaviors. It is usually not too late to change anti-
social patterns of behavior. Sanctions that include strict
and effective interventions can direct anti-social and
dangerous juveniles onto a different path that will make
Americans safer.
The Problem
Across the United States, law enforcement is busy
arresting, prosecuting, and holding in custody offending
juveniles. In 2002 there were more than 1.6 million
delinquency cases.1 The most dangerous of these youths
are appropriately locked up. In 2002, nine percent of
delinquency cases, or 144,000 cases, resulted in the
youth being placed in custody following a hearing on
their crime.2
The problem – one with disastrous consequences for
public safety – is that police officers, prosecutors, and
sheriffs find themselves arresting, prosecuting, and hous-
ing some of the same kids again and again. The good
news is that for juveniles who come before the court for
their first offense, six out of ten will not return to juvenile
court again. But for second-time juvenile offenders who
are age 14 or younger, 77 percent will come back for a
third court appearance.3
These recidivism rates indicate that America is failing
its young people and endangering its communities.4 The
cost of the system is high. For example, the price for a
juvenile placed in the custody of the New York Office of
Children and Family Services is $125,000 over 10
months.5 By contrast, the State University of New York
reports that their typical expenses for tuition room and
board are about $17,000 a year.6 In Montana, the Youth
Services Division of the Montana State Department of
Corrections is currently spending almost $20 million a
year to supervise and incarcerate juvenile offenders.7
In addition, repeat crime results in massive economic
and human costs for enforcement, loss of property, and
loss of life. 
Maintaining a broken juvenile corrections system is
clearly not cost-effective, and it does not effectively
reduce future crime by troubled kids or protect our com-
munities. High rates of repeat offending among incarcer-
ated youth are the warning signs that secure corrections
facilities are not correcting criminal behavior; that trou-
bled kids with mental health problems are not being
properly identified and treated; and that kids who serve
time are not being adequately monitored and provided
with proven interventions that reduce their anti-social
behavior when they return to their communities.
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Who is doing most of the crimes?
Any analysis of juvenile crime in America must keep
in mind two key points:
• Most juveniles arrested are not likely to become
serious offenders. As noted above, nationally, 6 in 10
juveniles brought before a juvenile court for the first
time will not return to court on another charge.8 And,
because their crimes are minor, most juvenile offend-
ers are not held before the hearing on their case or fol-
lowing the hearing. Of the 1,615,400 estimated delin-
quency cases handled nationally in 2002, one in five
were detained prior to the hearing.9 Following their
hearing, of the youth found responsible for the crime,
144,000 were placed out-of-home.10 In other words, of
the 1,615,400 delinquency cases, 9 percent resulted in
the youth being placed in custody following their
hearing. This report will show how the number of juve-
niles held in detention before or after their hearings
could be reduced further while cutting additional
crimes. However, it is important keep in mind that
most juveniles’ contact with the juvenile court system
does not involve detention prior to a hearing or cus-
tody afterwards, and their involvement with the juve-
nile courts is not ongoing.
• The small number of juveniles who are serious
offenders, however, often continue committing
crimes into adulthood. States report their recidivism
data in different ways, sometimes measuring re-
arrests, other times reporting on re-incarceration
rates. But however they report it, the data clearly
shows that the current system is ineffective. For exam-
ple, one-year follow-up data for states across America
shows that 5 to 7 out of 10 juvenile offenders released
from custody are re-arrested within one year. In South
Carolina, 47 percent were rearrested within one year,
while in Delaware 69 percent were re-arrested (see the
graph below).11 When New York State followed youth
leaving custody for more years – three years, not just
one – they found that 75 percent of juvenile offenders
leaving custody were re-arrested within three years.12
Academic research and the first-hand experience of
law enforcement confirm that serious violence is con-
fined to a small minority of young people. For example,
in the mid-nineties, criminologist David Kennedy care-
fully studied violence in Boston and found that, “Even in
dangerous neighborhoods, only a tiny minority, fewer
than one percent of the juveniles and young adults were
caught up in the violence. … They were involved in drug
dealing street groups and enmeshed in shooting disputes
with other chronic offenders. Most of the violence was
not about the drug business, but about respect, boy/girl
matters and standing vendettas, the origins of which were
unclear even to the participants.”13
This report will begin by focusing on what works with
juveniles who pose the greatest risk to their communities.
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What works with the highest-
risk offenders
While in custody
Young offenders whose crimes and risk assessments
show they are a dangerous threat to their communities
need to be placed in secure juvenile facilities where they
cannot harm their neighbors. In 2002, the courts placed
offenders from 144,000 juvenile delinquency cases in
custody.14 But simply warehousing high-risk offenders
during their time in custody is not adequate. They need
to do the hard work of confronting and changing their
anti-social beliefs and behaviors.  If approaches proven
by research to work are used to achieve those changes,
then high-risk youths are more likely to return to their
communities as less of a danger than when they went
into custody. 
Research shows that the best results in reducing crime
are achieved by targeting the worst offenders. The reason
is straightforward: one cannot prevent most low-risk
juveniles from committing more crimes because they
were not going to do more crimes anyway. But high-risk
offenders are very likely to commit more crimes and
more serious crimes. So any progress achieved with high-
er-risk juveniles results in very meaningful reductions in
future crime. 
Two states have implemented reforms targeted towards
those young offenders. Missouri has reformed how it
handles juvenile offenders in state custody producing
positive results. Wisconsin also has achieved impressive
results with a specific intervention targeted to its juve-
niles in custody who have serious psychological prob-
lems.
Missouri
In 1994, Missouri began replacing its large juvenile
corrections facility, known as a training school, with
smaller facilities closer to the communities where the
young offenders lived. Fulton Treatment Center, which
opened in 1997, has become the prototype for Missouri’s
reforms. It uses an open-dorm model within a locked
perimeter fence that guarantees security for the surround-
ing community. The facility has 33 beds, and the very
carefully chosen staff members work constantly with the
young offenders to help them control the problems they
have with aggression, substance abuse, or other anti-
social behaviors. Staff members are not the only ones
teaching the teens new social skills and holding them
accountable for their behavior: the other juveniles, in
groups of 10 to 12, are enlisted through group meetings
and routine interactions throughout the day to ensure
that everyone learns to behave appropriately. These trou-
bled teens are not just doing their time. Working togeth-
er, they are learning how to change their lives. Missouri
has a special team that tracks the activities of the youth
when they return from custody to their communities. The
team makes sure these youth stay out of further trouble.15
States collect data differently on re-arrests, re-convic-
tions, and additional incarcerations, and they collect the
data over different periods of time, making it hard to
compare results across states. However, some compar-
isons are possible. For example, Missouri has reconvic-
tion data that can be compared to similar New York
reconviction data. The three-year re-conviction rate for
juveniles leaving Missouri’s juvenile custody system is 37
percent.16 That rate is 40 percent lower than the closest
comparable three-year re-conviction (not arrest) rate of
62 percent for juvenile delinquents leaving state custody
in New York.17 (New York’s re-arrest rate is 72 percent.).18
Wisconsin
Some of the most troubled teen boys in Wisconsin
state custody who had failed in other settings were trans-
ferred to the Mendota Center to receive special help in
changing their behavior. The center is located within a
Wisconsin Intervention Reduces Repeat Crimes
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high security state mental health institute. In their prior
placements, the behavior of most of the troubled teens
had been in a spiral downward during which sanctions
were imposed repeatedly for negative behaviors. When
sanctions were imposed, the offenders became antago-
nistic and responded with more negative behaviors. That
was followed with more sanctions, and more negative
behaviors. By using skilled mental health staff members,
instead of corrections officers, the center was able to
break through and connect with these very troubled
teens. Then the staff began teaching them how to control
their aggressive, anti-social behaviors. Similar to what
was discovered in Missouri, Dr. Gregory Van Rybroek,
the director, reported that finding the right staff who can
connect with the offenders was essential, as was being
able to combine enhanced security with continued train-
ing of the youth in changing their behaviors.19
One evaluation of the intervention matched 101 teens
going through the Mendota Center with 101 similarly
troubled teens in the regular juvenile corrections system.
Within an average follow-up period of 53 months after
their release, teens not in the center were charged with
twice as many offenses per person and had more than
three times the number of violent offenses per person as
teens served in the center.20
Another analysis of the Mendota Center intervention
compared the young offenders at Mendota to another
similar group of 147 other seriously troubled offenders in
state custody and followed them upon release over a
period of 54 months.  None of the 101 offenders from the
Center committed a homicide during that follow-up peri-
od, but 10 of the 147 offenders in the control group were
charged with murder. A total of sixteen people were
killed by the 147 offenders not going through Mendota.21
More research is needed to confirm that this approach
can be replicated elsewhere with similar results. These
results, however, appear to be further evidence that the
negative behaviors of many very troubled juveniles can
be changed, improving the safety of our communities. 
When the most dangerous offenders
return home
Even if dangerous juveniles serve substantial time, they
usually end up back in their communities. This can be a
danger to the safety of their neighbors if they receive lit-
tle supervision and assistance to avoid more crime. A
combination of intensive police supervision, expedited
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Project Safe Neighborhood included increased federal prosecution for gun crimes and used offender 
notification meetings and increased services—a carrot-and-stick approach—that sharply brought 
down homicides in the west side Chicago neighborhood where it was tested. Homicides also 
dropped, but not as fast in a similar south side control neighborhood and city-wide.
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sanctions for repeated violence, community pressure,
and expedited access to jobs, drug treatment or other
services – a carrot-and-stick approach  – has shown in a
number of cities that it can cut homicides by violent
offenders in high-crime neighborhoods.
Chicago copied and further refined the carrot-and-
stick approach first developed in Boston for use with
juvenile and adult gang members. In Chicago, the inter-
vention was first applied to serious violent offenders who
were returning to their communities from prison. The vio-
lent offenders were called into a meeting where a team
of police officers and prosecutors explained that the
young men on parole were being carefully watched and
were facing expedited and severe sanctions if they com-
mitted another violent offense, especially one involving a
gun. Then they heard from former gang members who
had successfully turned their lives around. Finally social
service providers told the offenders that, as Andrew
Papachristos of the University of Chicago explained, if
the parolees needed drug treatment or a job (if necessary,
a government-subsidized job), they were available: “You
can sign up now and start Monday.”22
In the most rigorous research to date on this carrot-
and-stick method, this approach was tried in a group of
west side Chicago neighborhoods with a population of
nearly 8,000 residents. The neighborhoods had a long
history of high levels of homicide. This research was
done under the auspices of the federally-funded Project
Safe Neighborhoods (PSN). Meanwhile, another set of
neighborhoods in the south side of Chicago with a simi-
lar, though less serious, history of homicides served as
the control group because there was not enough initial
funding to do this carrot-and-stick approach citywide. In
the carrot-and-stick area there was a 37 percent drop in
quarterly homicide rates following the offender notifica-
tion meetings, while the decline in homicides in the
other neighborhood during the same period was only 18
percent.23
A similar carrot-and-stick approach was originally
tried with gang members in Boston. David Kennedy, then
at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard and
now at John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York
City, explained that their coalition of law enforcement
leaders, local religious leaders, street mentors, and serv-
ice providers “used enforcement as sparingly as possible,
and combined it with services and the moral voice of the
community.” Kennedy found that, “After adjusting for
existing trends, youth homicides (victims ages 24 and
under) went down by two-thirds.” When replicated in
Indianapolis, homicides went down quickly by 34 per-
cent.xi In Philadelphia, a similar targeting of young
offenders on probation or parole – those who were most
likely to “kill or be killed” – was implemented in three
police districts. An evaluation showed that homicides
decreased by between 32 and 62 percent in those dis-
tricts. Since that data was collected, homicides have
gone up overall in Philadelphia. Two of the districts
where the programs are operating have also seen increas-
es above their reduced levels, but the increases have
been slower than citywide, and in the other district
where the program operates, homicides have continued
to go down.24
The Chicago effort was specifically targeted at violent
offenders returning to their neighborhoods from adult
prison, whether they entered custody as teenagers or
adults. However the experience of Boston, Philadelphia
and other cities show that the most dangerous juvenile
offenders, not just young adults, should also be targeted
for carrot-and-stick style sanctions and interventions. This
approach has also been successful in medium-sized
cities, such as Baton Rouge, La. and Stockton, Calif.25
Sustaining a team focus is essential. Indianapolis has a
paid staff member to ensure their team stays together and
their meetings with high-risk juveniles and adults contin-
ue.26 Unfortunately, in Boston, as the coalition of law
enforcement, service providers, and community leaders
broke up over time, homicides started going back up.27
What works with medium-risk
offenders
Who need out-of-home placements
The prior section discussed what to do with the high-
est-risk, most violence-prone juveniles. However, many
young offenders are placed in state custody or are held
following their hearings in local facilities even though
they are not at especially high-risk of violent offending.
This section will explore what works with many of those
juveniles held in medium- or low-level security facilities
to reduce their future involvement in crime.
Missouri 
The Missouri approach to juvenile facilities was dis-
cussed above as a solution for the most serious offenders.
Missouri also follows the same model of smaller facilities
and intensive efforts to change anti-social behaviors at its
less-secure facilities. These facilities, located throughout
the state, are aimed at reducing repeat crimes among
juvenile delinquents who do not need high-security con-
Fight Crime: Invest in Kids8
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finement, but who do need intensive help to change their
criminal behaviors. The Missouri model should be con-
sidered as one option for how to more effectively deal
with less-dangerous juvenile offenders who cannot
remain in their homes.
Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care
(MTFC)
Another option for many of these young offenders is
individual placement in a Multidimensional Treatment
Foster Care home instead of with other delinquent juve-
niles in a county or state facility. Foster care may sound
like a “soft” sanction for juveniles who should be paying
a more severe price for the crimes they committed. But
for teens who are often used to running the streets, a
month in custody may become a chance to socialize
with delinquents and learn new criminal behaviors. In
contrast, the MTFC approach creates a highly controlled
environment and is instead a very tough intervention
with consistent monitoring and appropriate sanctions.
The foster parents are carefully chosen and trained and
usually only work with one child at a time. When juve-
nile offenders come into their homes, the youngsters are
initially not allowed to leave their sight during waking
hours. They must earn the right to be alone those first few
days. Then they must attend school regularly, carrying a
card each day for their teachers to sign. Teachers from
every period must sign the card, noting whether the stu-
dents showed up and behaved appropriately. Eventually
the youngsters can earn opportunities to interact with
positive peers outside of school, but negative behaviors
quickly result in the loss of those privileges. Meanwhile,
a professional works with each teen to train them in the
social skills they need to avoid fights or situations that
can lead to further crime. 
Participation of parents or guardians is integral to this
program. While the child is living in this very controlled
environment for six months to a year, his or her parents
are being trained to take over and establish and enforce
the same rules and expectations when their child returns
home.28
MTFC is more effective at reducing future arrests than
placement in a group home. Research shows the MTFC
approach successfully cuts the average number of arrests
for seriously delinquent juveniles in half (2.6 arrests per
teen vs. 5.4 arrests), and six times as many of the boys in
MTFC as boys in a group home successfully avoided any
new arrest (41 percent vs. 7 percent).29
MTFC can also be an option for juvenile offenders re-
entering their communities after state, county or city cus-
tody if they do not have stable homes to return to. At a
treatment foster care home, young offenders leaving cus-
tody can learn the skills they will need to stay out of trou-
ble as they return to school or seek employment. Their
parents will also receive the training they need to contin-
ue this process once their children transition fully back
home.
Throughout the United States, there are 30 agencies
operating MTFC homes at various sites.30 For MTFC to
work in counties with smaller populations of offenders,
the counties may have to develop partnerships with
neighboring counties to cost-effectively arrange for the
training, supervision, and support of MTFC foster families
in their county. 
Who can receive interventions instead of
custody
Ohio
There are times when the nature of the crime or crimes
committed simply demands that a juvenile be sentenced
to state, county or city custody following their hearing. In
other situations though, court-ordered alternative sanc-
tions as part of the probation process that do not include
custody may actually work better to reduce future crime.
If in addition to the usual probation measures, such as
community service and curfews, the judge also orders
participation in a carefully structured intervention, the
juveniles can be taught to avoid crime by adopting new
social skills, attitudes and beliefs. 
Boys in Foster Care with Specially 
Trained Foster Parents vs. Group Homes 
are One-sixth as Likely to Have any 
More Arrests
Percent of youths re-arrested at least once
41%
7%
Boys in group 
home
Boys in 
Multidimensional 
Treatment Foster 
Care
Blueprints for Violence Prevention
C
ha
m
be
rl
ai
n 
&
 M
ih
al
ic
 19
98
There is strong evidence that this approach of redirect-
ing juvenile offenders to effective interventions will save
money and cut crime. An analysis of an effort in Ohio,
called RECLAIM Ohio, found that diverting low, moder-
ate, and in some cases even high-risk juveniles to com-
munity sanctions with effective interventions in place of
custody worked. The data collected by Christopher
Lowenkamp and Edward Latessa, professors at the
University of Cincinnati, showed that, if low- to moder-
ate-risk offenders were placed in custody and not in a
community RECLAIM intervention, they returned to cus-
tody upon release at five to seven times the rate of juve-
niles in the RECLAIM interventions.31
It is important to note that this approach should not be
directed to the very high-risk offenders. The RECLAIM
researchers found that the very highest risk juveniles –
teens with a combination of current felonies, prior
felonies and at least three referrals to the courts starting
before age 14 – should not be diverted to community
interventions. These very high-risk juveniles did worse if
they were diverted to RECLAIM interventions instead of
custody. For example, very high-risk offenders placed in
RECLAIM instead of in local or state custody were
brought back before the courts for committing crimes 41
percent to 64 percent more often than juveniles placed in
custody.32 But for low-, medium- and even some high-
risk offenders, RECLAIM reduces crime better than plac-
ing kids in custody. 
Risk assessments are essential 
The RECLAIM results clearly showed the importance
of taking into account a juvenile’s risk of committing
more crimes. Decisions on where offenders will serve
their sentence and what services they need to avoid
future crime, especially violent crime, should be careful-
ly informed by scientifically valid risk assessments. Many
states are using an excellent risk assessment tool known
as the Youth Assessment and Screening Instrument, YASI,
which is based on a well respected risk assessment
instrument developed in Washington State.33 It looks not
only at the number and nature of crimes committed, as
was done for assessing youth in RECLAIM, but also at the
juvenile’s personal history and the strengths and weak-
nesses of the support systems the young offender can rely
on to stay free of crime. Another successful tool, the
Massachusetts Youth Screening Instrument, or MAYSI,
quickly and effectively screens arrested youth for possi-
ble mental health problems.34 Not all jurisdictions have
yet implemented evidence-based risk assessments. And
the YASI or other risk assessment tools will be useless
unless they are used to guide court decisions and there
are interventions available to help youth avoid continued
involvement in crime.
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Scientifically-tested interventions 
The best way to ensure that streets will be safer is to
rely on sanctions and interventions proven by the best
methods of scientific testing. It is common practice now
in the medical sciences to randomly assign half the peo-
ple in a test to receive a medicine while the other half
receive placebos. In juvenile justice research this is done
by randomly assigning half the juveniles to receive a new
intervention and the other half to receive the usual serv-
ices they would otherwise receive. Then the researchers
monitor crime data over time to see which group com-
mits more crime. There is now solid evidence, gathered
from a growing number of such randomized controlled
trials, that shows what really works. Two approaches, in
particular, have been shown to reliably cut crime:
Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy (CBT) and the related
Family Therapy. In short, the first one gives troubled teens
the tools they will need to behave responsibly, and the
second approach gives parents the tools they will need to
regain control of their kids, keep them off the streets, and
steer them away from crime.  
Cognitive Behavior Therapy teaches
teens to control their aggression or stop
using drugs
Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) for delinquent
teens is an approach, not a specific intervention. It was
developed from original research on what works to help
many people, not just juvenile delinquents, to change
their undesirable behaviors. When applied to delinquent
juveniles, the researchers found that many young offend-
ers have developed thinking, beliefs, and behaviors that
repeatedly land them in trouble. They often misinterpret
others’ benign actions as threats. Many troubled juve-
niles approach challenging situations as victims, feeling
they are hated and unfairly blamed.35 CBT interventions
use tested, concrete methods for teaching teens to “stop
and think before acting, to consider the consequences of
their behavior, to conceptualize alternative ways of
responding to interpersonal problems and to consider the
impact of their behavior on other people, particularly the
victims.”36 By learning what triggers their negative behav-
iors and by identifying and practicing more pro-social
and effective ways to respond, CBT consistently reduced
repeat crimes among both juveniles and adults. 
A recent review by Mark Lipsey and Nana
Landenberger from Vanderbilt of 58 CBT randomized
controlled trials and other careful trials found that, on
average, the re-arrest rate among the adults or juveniles
in CBT was 25 percent less than for those not in a CBT
intervention. And CBT interventions using the most effec-
tive configurations – programs that treated higher risk
offenders, were implemented well, and included anger
control and interpersonal problem solving  – reduced re-
arrest rates by 50 percent.37
CBT can be successfully used with juveniles as an
alternative to custody while they are on probation, while
they are in custody, or with juveniles returning home
from custody. Many different providers have delivered
CBT services and as long as what they provide is faithful
to the CBT model, the research by Lipsey and
Landenberger showed it worked.38 The Lipsey and
Landenberger review found that CBT is one of the most
rigorously tested and reliably successful interventions to
be found anywhere in the social sciences.39
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Cognitive Behavioral Therapies (CBT) Results
Aggression Replacement Training (ART)
At under $1,000 per juvenile, this CBT 
intervention that targets aggression is a 
relatively low-cost intervention for teens 
on probation or in custody.105
Motivational Enhancement Therapy & 
Cognitive Behavior Therapy (MET/CBT) 
This intervention is for outpatient use with 
substance-abusing teens.107
Offenders leaving a New York State Juvenile facility were 
almost three times more likely to have been arrested within 6 
months of release if they did not receive ART services while 
in custody than if they did (43 percent vs. 15 percent).106 
The average number of days in a year that persons who 
successfully complete an outpatient substance abuse 
treatment intervention are drug free increases by 25% to 
35% if they receive MET/CBT (251, 256, and 269 days 
drug free in three trials of MET/CBT vs. 200 drug free days 
in an average outpatient treatment intervention).108 
Training families to control their
delinquent children
Another series of proven interventions (which typically
incorporate cognitive behavior therapy as part of their set
of tools) is family therapy. Family therapy is a very broad-
ly used term that includes marriage counseling and vari-
ous other interventions. But a more specific range of fam-
ily therapy interventions that target young offenders with
aggression and/or substance abuse problems have proven
results. 
Most troubled young people, even if they go into cus-
tody, will return to their families. Families play an influen-
tial role in their children’s aggression or substance abuse,
but that influence can be either positive or negative.
Many parents, who may have made many unwise deci-
sions themselves, do not want their children to make the
same mistakes. They may be poorly trained, however, in
how to keep their children off the streets, out of fights,
and away from drugs, especially if they live in dangerous
neighborhoods. 
Effective family therapy typically begins by convincing
families that change is possible.  It usually involves teach-
ing families how to stop arguing with each other. Then
parents are taught how to keep better track of their child’s
behavior, set clear limits, followed by reinforcement using
increased autonomy, such as allowing their children addi-
tional unsupervised time with positive peers. 
Once parents have been given the right tools, the pro-
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Family Therapies Results
Functional Family Therapy (FFT)
FFT is for moderate- to high-risk teens with delin-
quency, aggression and/or substance abuse prob-
lems. FFT can be used for youths on probation, in lieu 
of custody, or for youths returning to their families 
from custody.109  FFT is provided at over 200 sites 
across America and internationally. It is available in 
multiple sites in NY, WA, PA, VA, NM, OH and FL.110 
Multisystemic Therapy (MST)
Similar to FFT, MST serves moderate to high-risk 
teens, though MST often serves teens more involved 
in drug abuse and/or crime than those served by 
FFT 112.  It is now offered by 137 agencies in 33 
states and the District of Columbia. 113
FFT cut re-arrests in half in one study (26 percent 
vs. 50 percent) and subsequent out-of-home 
placements by three quarters in another study 
(18 percent vs. 72 percent). 111 
One MST study followed juvenile offenders until 
they were, on average, 29 years old. Individuals 
who had not received MST were 62 percent 
more likely to have been arrested for any offense 
(81 percent vs. 50 percent), and more than 
twice as likely to be arrested for a violent offense 
(30 percent vs. 14 percent). 114 
Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care (MTFC)
This family therapy intervention can be used in place 
of being placed in low-security custody in a group 
setting, or as a step-down intervention for offenders 
leaving custody who do not have stable families to 
return to.  There are 30 agencies operating MTFC at 
sites throughout America. 108
Brief Strategic Family Therapy (BSFT)
This is a family therapy aimed at reducing a youth’s 
drug use and conduct disorder.110
MTFC cut the average number of repeat arrests 
per teen in half (2.6 arrests vs. 5.4). Six times as 
many of the boys in MTFC as boys in a group 
home had successfully avoided any new arrest 
(41 percent vs. 7 percent). 117 
Forty three percent of youth with conduct disor-
der (defiant and/or delinquent behavior) in BSFT 
showed clinically significant reductions, while 
youth in group counseling showed no reductions.  
Additionally, substance abusing youth in BSFT 
were 3.5 times more likely to show clinically 
significant reductions in drug use than substance 
abusing youth in group counseling.119  
For more information on each of these evidence-based interventions, see Appendix A.
fessionals help them practice until they are getting results
on their own. Others are brought into the process, such as
extended family members, teachers, positive peers, and
service providers. They can increase the quantity and
quality of positive influences in troubled teens’ lives, and
help strengthen the parents’ ability to manage their chil-
dren’s behaviors. Together this extended network helps
embed the juveniles in a positive environment that keeps
them away from drugs and crime. 
A number of family therapy interventions have been
repeatedly evaluated using randomized controlled trials.
The body of research shows that – when properly imple-
mented – quality family therapy interventions can reduce
substance abuse and repeat crimes.
For more information on each of these evidence-based
interventions, see Appendix A.
High-quality interventions and an effec-
tive staff produce the best results
Mark Lipsey and his team looked at a large number of
studies of interventions to prevent juvenile delinquency
that typically compared the intervention being studied to
the usual services that would otherwise be available for a
juvenile offender in a locality (such as simple probation,
placement in a group home, or probation with individual
counseling). Lipsey not only looked at whether, overall,
the interventions worked better than the usual services
the juvenile would be assigned to, he also looked for
clues from the various studies as to why they worked.
Specifically, he looked at whether the design of the inter-
ventions was weak (interventions cobbled together) or
strong (interventions based on past scientific research and
development, which were then carefully tested). Lipsey
also looked at whether or not a well-trained, experienced
staff was implementing the program.
Lipsey and his team found that a weak intervention
with ineffective staff, not surprisingly, does not reduce
repeat crimes compared to usual services. Interestingly, if
the intervention was either strongly designed but poorly
staffed, or weakly designed but well staffed, it produced
the same results: a 24 percent reduction in repeat crimes
compared to the usual services being offered young
offenders. But, if the intervention was both strongly
designed and well staffed, the results were almost twice
as strong: a 46 percent reduction in repeat crimes.40
This table shows that localities that have not started
using proven interventions for their delinquent juveniles
can cut repeat crimes almost in half among eligible
offenders. Even in states, counties and cities already using
proven interventions, they can cut repeat crimes an addi-
tional 22 percentage points among eligible offenders by
ensuring the intervention is run by well-trained, experi-
enced staff.
Choosing programs
Based in part on the above research, experts in the
field suggest that, when choosing which scientifically-
tested intervention to adopt, policy-makers and adminis-
trators need to carefully consider whether they have the
ongoing funding to support a particular intervention, and
also whether they have the ability to recruit to their area
the level of trained personnel necessary for that particu-
lar intervention. Some interventions are more expensive
or require more highly-trained personnel than others.
Picking an evidence-based intervention that cannot be
implemented well locally will get a county only half way
down the road to lowered crime rates. Picking the right
intervention and providing it with well-qualified and
well-trained staff, however, can easily pay for itself by
reducing future crime.
What works 
(and doesn’t work) to 
reduce repeat crimes by juveniles 
A poorly trained staff
A well-trained and effective staff
24% reduction in 
repeat crimes
46% reduction in
repeat crimes
24% reduction in
repeat crimes
No reduction in
repeat crimes compared to
usual services
A weakly-designed
intervention
A strongly-designed
intervention120
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Substance abusing teens 
Drug and alcohol abuse are a huge problem among
young offenders. While only eight percent of young peo-
ple in juvenile facilities were actually being held prima-
rily because of drug charges,41 the National Institute on
Drug Abuse (NIDA) of the National Institutes of Health
reports that, nationally, “in 2002, … 60 percent of
detained boys and nearly half of the girls tested positive
for drug use.”42
The juvenile justice system is the most common path-
way by which young people receive substance abuse
treatment in America. Nationally, over 50 percent of the
referrals for juvenile substance abuse treatment in 2003
came from the juvenile justice system.43 One problem is
that teens have even more trouble than adults in recog-
nizing they are having problems with alcohol or drugs.44
But there is also a severe shortage of treatment options,
especially for low-income juveniles. 
Young offenders entering the juvenile justice system
should be routinely and appropriately screened for drug
or alcohol problems. Catching substance abuse early is
important because, according to Michael Dennis, a
national expert on drug abuse, “90 percent of all individ-
uals with dependence started using before the age of 18,
and half started using before the age of 15.”45 Appropriate
questioning will differentiate juveniles who are just
experimenting from juveniles who are regularly abusing
or actually dependent on drugs or alcohol. The juveniles
who are abusing or dependent should receive effective
treatment.46
Dennis explains that substance abuse needs to be
treated as a chronic health problem. “Seventy percent of
the kids who are treated will relapse. But if you go
through and treat them 3 or 4 times, 70 percent will
recover.”47 Dennis has also written that, “To reduce the
long-term costs of chronic [dependence on drugs or alco-
hol] to individuals, their families and society, it is impor-
tant to diagnose and intervene as early as possible, ideal-
ly with adolescents and young adults.”48
Drug treatment for youth in custody
An approach to drug treatment known as therapeutic
communities has shown consistent success with adults in
custody and also has been shown to work with juveniles
in custody. In this approach teen offenders play a very
active role in confronting their peers’ behaviors.”49 The
approach also incorporates some aspects of cognitive
behavior therapy. In one test, within 21 months after
release, the teens not receiving the therapeutic commu-
nity treatment were more than twice as likely to be re-
incarcerated (37 percent incarcerated vs. 17 percent) as
those receiving therapeutic community treatment.50
Outpatient drug treatment for 
delinquent juveniles
NIDA has recommended that many substance-abusing
young people should be directed to out-patient family
therapies such as FFT, MST, and BSFT.51
Michael Dennis and his colleagues have conducted
other randomized controlled trials of the most promising
interventions and found that a cognitive behavioral inter-
vention, MET/CBT, that included a motivational compo-
nent, could also be effective (see the table on cognitive
behavioral therapies above).52
Assertive follow-up works after 
treatment
For young offenders leaving treatment, supportive serv-
ices and – if needed – additional treatment, greatly
increases the likelihood of eventual success. The
Adolescent Community Reinforcement Approach (ACRA)
provides assertive follow-up instead of the typical, less
intensive after-care, such as just providing directions to
the local 12-step meetings for teens. It has proven results.
Teens receiving ACRA were 68 percent more likely to
abstain from further marijuana use (52 percent vs. 31
percent).53 (See Appendix A for more information on
ACRA.)
Many other youth do not need
juvenile justice programs 
Juvenile justice programs are not necessary for many
first-time or low-level offenders.  Often, parents taking
responsibility for their troubled youth will be enough to
prevent more crime if the parents can also draw on com-
munity resources. 
Research shows that young people who have commit-
ted a large number of crimes before being caught the first
time may not find one arrest enough to convince them to
stop, but for teenagers who are just starting to commit
crimes, such as shoplifting, one arrest can be enough to
turn them away from further criminal behavior.54
Nationally, six in 10 juveniles who are referred to juve-
nile court do not return.55 Juveniles need to learn they
must pay a price for their crimes, but that price may not
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need to include custody or extensive interventions paid
for by the juvenile justice system for many first-time
delinquents. With help from local programs in their com-
munity, parents can usually step in to make sure a first-
time offender does not return to court on additional
charges. 
There is a physiological reason why many teenagers
break the law. Most adolescents are more impulsive, inat-
tentive, and insensitive to the consequences of their
actions than adults. Scans of adolescents’ brains show
their prefrontal cortex, which is the seat of rational
thought and the ability to control impulses, is not fully
developed until early adulthood.56 That tendency to
impulsive behavior frequently includes impulsive crimi-
nal behavior. National surveys of teens conducted from
1997 to 2001 found that 38 percent of 17 year-old boys
and 30 percent of girls that age admitted having commit-
ted a petty theft.57 Another national survey conducted in
2003 found that over half of all high school seniors
admitted having tried an illicit drug.58
Relatively minor sanctions, such as a fine or commu-
nity service, may serve justice and be adequate to stop
many young offenders from committing more crimes –
especially if parents do their part. 
Restorative justice interventions are another option
that recognizes how crime impacts victims and commu-
nities. These interventions allow victims to speak about
the impact of the offense, and work with the offender on
the best way to repair the harm. Typically this is done
through agreed upon restitution or community service.
Restorative justice often includes victim-offender dia-
logue, victim impact panels, and community-based
accountability boards. Research shows these programs
are very popular with crime victims.59
If delinquent young people have other risk factors for
crime or are very young when arrested the first time, it
may be especially wise for parents to carefully monitor
and control which peers they associate with and to enroll
them in proven community programs such as Boys and
Girls Clubs, Big Brothers/Big Sisters, or other interven-
tions for at-risk youth that are not necessarily part of the
juvenile justice system.60 But, funding for the more
expensive interventions that are provided through the
juvenile justice system should be reserved for young
offenders whose risk assessments show they are more
likely to continue committing more crimes. 
Reducing detention before
hearings saves money 
Reducing the number of juveniles detained while
awaiting hearings may not immediately reduce repeat
crimes. In fact, if some young people are not placed in
detention, they may commit more crimes before they
come back for a hearing. However, detention reform can
be done effectively: 80 locations around the United
States are working with the Juvenile Detention
Alternative Initiative,61 and many other locations are
using other approaches to detention reform. They have
found that, under the right circumstances, detention
reform can be used to safely redirect and supervise
young offenders who are not a serious threat to their
communities, or status offenders (truants, runaways, etc.)
who should be redirected away from the court system
altogether. Reducing detention prior to hearings will free
up juvenile justice resources that should be redirected
into proven interventions for the more serious offenders.
One of the best ways to fund the proven interventions for
more troubled youth is to reduce spending on unneces-
sary detention prior to hearings.
Across the United States, local jurisdictions are show-
ing they can successfully reduce the number of young
people held in detention by 30 to 60 percent while main-
taining public safety. 
What we know works to keep low-risk offenders out of
detention prior to hearings:
Screening
Properly screening arrested young people rather than
routinely detaining them is the most crucial step in
reducing unnecessary detention before hearings. In
Seattle, efforts are succeeding in keeping more juveniles
from ever entering detention following arrest by using a
simple assessment tool and other efforts to keep youth
out of lock up.62 Even if youth are initially detained
awaiting their hearing because their parents could not be
found or for other reasons, an effective screening tool –
such as the Youth Assessment and Screening Instrument
(YASI) – can be used to divert the lower-risk youths out of
detention and into other forms of supervision (discussed
below) until their hearing.63
Reducing bureaucratic delays
Even when young people must be held before their
hearings, often their stay in detention can be shortened.
Fight Crime: Invest in Kids16
Simple reforms such as utilizing “case expediters,”64
common “discovery request forms,”65 and quick, initial
screens for mental health problems can streamline the
process.66 If a full mental health work-up is indicated,
either placing the mental health clinic in the city deten-
tion facility67 – if it serves enough juveniles - or simply
ensuring the mental health evaluations are expedited can
help reduce the total number of young people held in
detention facilities awaiting assessments. Chicago’s Court
Clinic cut the amount of time to complete mental health
assessments in half.68
Timely warnings and follow-up
Juvenile offenders often end up in detention because
they miss court dates. Often the offenders purposely
ignore the court date and a new warrant for their arrest
and detention should be issued. But other times it is not
that purposeful. One solution that works is to do what
doctor and dentist offices frequently do: have court or
detention staff call the juvenile’s house with a reminder
shortly before the court date.69 If a court date is missed,
having court personnel quickly check on why that hap-
pened may, at least in some cases, cut short the automat-
ic process of issuing a court order and sending police out
to arrest and detain the young offender.70
Alternatives to detention 
In some localities, the only options available to author-
ities are to detain those accused of a crime or to send
them home. Unfortunately, this can mean many lower-
risk juveniles end up detained before their hearing, wast-
ing scarce juvenile system resources. A wider range of
available options would reduce the need for holding
juveniles before their hearings. The alternatives being
used around the country include: 
• Short-term alternatives to detention placement allow
police to get back out on the streets by dropping off
juvenile offenders with personnel who can take the
time to track down the juvenile’s parents or guardians
instead of placing the youths directly into detention.71
• Parental supervision combined with effective outside
supervision using probation staff members or a com-
munity representative ensures the young people are
attending school and observing curfews. 
• Electronic monitoring for some teens can track
whether they are staying where they are ordered to be. 
• Reporting centers are a successful innovation used
by Cook County. These reporting centers are a place
where teens are required to be when they are not at
home or in school. The centers are especially useful in
the after-school hours – the prime time for juvenile
crime on school days. The centers can serve as an
important location for delivering much needed sup-
port for troubled teens.72
In many places across the United States, lower-risk
juveniles are being properly identified and provided with
effective alternatives to detention so they will avoid com-
mitting more crimes and show up for their hearing. This
should allow localities to spend less time and money on
warehousing kids before their hearings and focus more
on targeted evidence-based efforts to keep serious young
offenders from becoming serious adult offenders. Some
localities have made great strides.
Success stories from across the United
States:
Cook County, Illinois cut its average daily population
in locked detention by more than a third from 1995 to
2005, in part because of detention reforms.73 The reform-
ers are especially proud of the fact that 97 percent of
young people directed to reporting centers instead of
detention before their hearings were arrest-free and
showed up for their appointed court date.74 In part
because of detention reforms, Cook County’s detention
admissions decreased by 30 percent between 1989 and
2000, while admissions went up 81 percent in the rest of
Illinois.75 By using MST and other reforms, Cook County
has also reduced by 44 percent the number of youth it
sends to state facilities following adjudication – from 902
in 1997 to 505 in 2004.76
Santa Cruz County, California is experiencing a 95
percent success rate with home supervision and a 98 per-
cent success rate with electronic monitoring in terms of
offenders who show up for their hearings without having
been arrested for any new crimes. Time spent in deten-
tion is also down: the average length of stay in Santa Cruz
County’s juvenile hall is now 10 days compared to a state
average of 27 days.77 Juvenile felony arrests are down 47
percent from 1997 to 2004, and the number of youths in
juvenile hall has dropped 65 percent from an average of
Cook County’s detention admissions
decreased by 30 percent between
1989 and 2000, while admissions went
up 81 percent in the rest of Illinois.
47 per day in 1997 to 16 in 2005.xxxviii By implement-
ing community-based alternatives to incarceration fol-
lowing any hearing, Santa Cruz is also sending 64 per-
cent fewer youths to state facilities – from 104 in 1996 to
38 in 2004.78
Bernalillo County, New Mexico implemented deten-
tion reforms for youth held pending their hearing cou-
pled with reforms for juveniles who would have gone
into custody following adjudication. Testifying before
Congress, Dr. Ken Martinez, the State Children’s
Behavioral Health Director, reported that the Bernalillo
County Juvenile Detention Center now has: 
• An average daily census of 65, down from 140. 
• An average length of stay of nine days, down from 33
days. 
• A cost for community custody intervention of $19.59
per day compared to a prior cost of $96.37 per day for
secure detention.
• A recidivism rate of 13 percent, down from 46 per-
cent.79 
New Jersey has also experienced success in reducing
the number of juveniles held in detention. In just over
two years of detention and child welfare reforms, the
number of juveniles held in detention in some counties
has dropped sharply. The reductions range from an 11
percent drop in Atlantic County to a 43 percent drop in
Essex County.80
Measuring re-offending and
using it to guide decisions
As the CompStat criminal data collection and
response system pioneered by Commissioner William
Bratton in New York City and similar systems across
America have shown, the careful collection, analysis and
use of timely crime data can help law enforcement offi-
cers prevent crime, not just respond to it. However, the
collection and use of re-offending data on young offend-
ers and adults is often far from adequate. It is essential to
break through legal, bureaucratic, and funding chal-
lenges that hinder the collection of re-offending data at
the city, county and state levels. However, the simple
collection of data is just the first step. The next step is to
use the data to hold facilities and programs accountable
for producing better results. Two states are path breakers
in doing this:
Washington has excellent statewide data available on
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Re-entry after custody:
reviewing what works
Too often, when juveniles return to their communities
after being held in custody. they return to their old ways.
Of teens committed to state juvenile custody, we
already reported that 5 to 7 out of 10 offenders are re-
arrested within one year.121 In New York, within three
years, 75 percent of juvenile offenders who left custody
were re-arrested.122 Several programs and approaches
already mentioned work to prevent crime when juve-
niles return home from incarceration:  
High Risk Young Offenders
For the highest-risk offenders leaving custody,
intensive carrot-and-stick approaches are needed.
That approach combines intensive law enforcement
supervision and severe sanctions if necessary but
also intensive social support and services to get
these dangerous juveniles on the right path. This
approach has repeatedly shown it can save lives.
Juveniles Without Stable Families
For offenders who do not have stable families to
return to, Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care
(MTFC) can provide a step down approach. For six to
12 months, specially trained foster parents teach the
young people social skills and attitudes to help them
avoid crime. At the same time, the juvenile’s parents
are being carefully trained to take over and follow
the same system of close supervision when their
child returns home.
Other Youths Returning Directly Home
Other offenders who can return to their families
may need, along with their families, Functional Family
Therapy (FFT) or Multisystemic Therapy (MST) in
order to ensure they learn more productive patterns
of behavior that will keep them from cycling repeat-
edly through the juvenile and adult criminal justice
systems.
Substance Abusing Youths
Finally, for substance-abusing youth, if a juvenile
received drug treatment in custody, assertive follow-
up upon release, such as provided by the Adolescent
Community Reinforcement Approach (ACRA) is an
effective tool to help ensure that relapses – which are
common – do not lead a juvenile to abandon efforts
to stay clean.
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repeat crimes. Steve Aos and his team at The Washington
State Institute for Public Policy, a legislative-sponsored
agency, produced a truly exceptional cost-benefit study
of interventions that reduce juvenile crime and other
problem outcomes.81 The Institute analyzed more than
3,000 interventions from around the country aimed at
reducing crime. Then the Institute looked at the results of
those interventions and examined whether they worked
or not. Following that review of the literature, Aos and his
team produced a cost-benefit analysis. The state has used
the analysis to guide them in choosing effective interven-
tions. Then Aos tested whether those interventions cho-
sen worked in real life in Washington State. For example,
their tracking found that FFT counselors who were well-
qualified cut repeat crimes sharply among the young
offenders they served in Washington, but unqualified FFT
counselors actually increased repeat crimes among the
offenders they served (compared to offenders in a control
group receiving another intervention.) Based on that evi-
dence, the legislature acted again on the Institute’s
advice and Washington now requires strong quality-con-
trol measures in all its juvenile justice interventions for
offenders. Aos and his team have thus developed a
sophisticated continuous improvement process that uses
data and science to help the state save money and cut
crime. 
Florida is also developing a statewide system to moni-
tor the repeat crime rates of all its juveniles and adults
who are held in custody – something that is still a chal-
lenge for many states. Florida uses a statewide risk-
assessment for each juvenile offender based on their indi-
vidual criminal and social history. Using that common
risk-assessment information, Florida will be able to give
each facility or intervention program a report on the level
of risks the juveniles in their care have for committing
more crimes when they leave. Then the statewide system
will be able to track the actual crimes committed by
graduates of those facilities or programs. This will allow
Florida to provide ongoing feedback to each institution
on their results over time so the programs can assess
whether their efforts are successfully reducing future
crime or not compared to what should be expected given
the risk-levels of the juveniles they served. In some cases,
ineffective facilities or programs will be closed down and
the youth transferred to more effective institutions where
better crime prevention results are more likely.82 
Cutting crime saves money
Florida found that redirecting 405 youth from county
residential delinquency programs to MST or FFT commu-
nity-based programs saved $5.8 million during the first
two years of the program by avoiding the extra costs of
out-of-home placements.83 DuPage County, Illinois has
also used MST and FFT to cut its out-of-home placement
costs from $3 million a year in the mid-1990’s to $1 mil-
lion in 2005.84
But the real test of whether reforms produce long-term
savings — or actually end up costing society more — will
be whether the interventions successfully reduce repeat
crimes. Each high-risk juvenile prevented from adopting
a life of crime could save the country between $1.7 mil-
lion and $2.3 million.85 Florida found that, when its MST
and FFT programs were implemented as planned, they
reduced repeat arrests by 45 percent (FFT in Broward
County) and by 48 percent (MST in Escambia County).
The properly implemented MST program in Escambia
County also cut felony arrests by 64 percent.86
Florida has not yet added the savings from reduced
crime into its $5.8 million reported savings, but Ohio did
have projections for both reductions in custody and
future crime costs. Ohio’s RECLAIM effort saved not only
$28,000 in juvenile custody costs by reassigning moder-
ate-risk juvenile offenders to community sanctions with
strict interventions, it also produced an additional
$19,000 in reduced crime savings. Total savings were
$47,000 per moderate-risk juvenile re-directed to com-
munity interventions. 
Steve Aos and his team at the Washington Institute for
Public Policy further confirmed that impressive savings
RECLAIM Ohio Saves Money
By reducing custody costs and cutting repeat crimes, 
RECLAIM Ohio saves taxpayers and crime victims 
$48,000 per moderate-risk juvenile offender in 
Community Custody.
$17,674
$65,211
RECLAIM Ohio’s 
Community 
Sanctions and 
Interventions
Community 
Custody
Lowenkamp and Letessa, 2005
are possible with a report released in October, 2006. That
study reviewed more than 571 interventions. Typically,
the studies Aos and his team looked at compared a new
intervention with the services youth would regularly
receive. Out of that comprehensive review of what works
they produced a cost benefit analysis. Many interven-
tions did not produce reductions in repeat crimes or sav-
ings, and a few, such as Scared Straight, made things
worse. Far too often, good intentions were not enough.
But Aos and his team found that some well-tested inter-
ventions delivered very strong results, as the table below
shows.
These proven interventions reduce repeat crimes so
much that they save an average of $15,000 to over
$75,000 for each juvenile offender served. Not only is
investment in these interventions imperative from a pub-
lic safety perspective, there is also a fiscal imperative to
reduce future costs to taxpayers. 
These intensive family therapy programs are utilized
throughout the United States but there is still huge unmet
need. FFT is available at approximately 200 sites,87 MST
is provided by 137 different agencies (with approximate-
ly 300 teams),88 and there are 30 locations providing
MTFC programs across America.89 Still, FFT serves only
approximately 6,000 youth per year.90 MST serves as
many as 10,000 youth per year.91 MTFC serves approxi-
mately 500 youth on any given day and roughly 800
youth per year.92 Together they reach approximately
17,000 youth per year.
Given that at least half of the 144,000 delinquents
placed out of home nationwide in 2002, and a significant
proportion (the more serious ones) of the 385,000 youth
placed on probation each year,93 could be more wisely
served by one of these three programs, it is easy to see
that together these programs could increase their cover-
age by a factor of ten or more before they would begin to
run out of eligible youth.94
Next steps 
The 3,500 members of Fight Crime: Invest in Kids are
convinced that the juvenile justice system can be
improved because positive change is already happening
in many places and in many different ways. Where
spending has been directed to what works, costs have
been cut and communities are safer. Several reforms are
needed:
• Ensure that high-risk juvenile offenders are held in
facilities that are better designed and staffed to teach
incarcerated juveniles how to avoid crime. Missouri has
developed a leading model for how to achieve this (see
p.6).
• Provide special treatment for incarcerated juvenile
offenders with serious mental health problems.
Wisconsin provides one model for doing this (p.6). The
high number of homicides committed by juvenile offend-
ers who did not receive Wisconsin’s mental health inter-
vention demonstrates why more research and adoption
of effective efforts with this extremely troubled popula-
tion are needed. 
• Make sure that the most dangerous juveniles leav-
ing custody are included in carrot-and-stick efforts that
provide increased supervision, expedited return to cus-
tody if necessary, community pressure, and expedited
access to jobs and substance abuse treatment.
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What reduces crime 
saves money123
Costs 
avoided by 
crime 
victims124
Savings to 
taxpayers 
from crime 
reduction 
only125
Program 
Costs
Net savings 
to taxpayers
Net savings 
to taxpayers 
and victims
Savings or costs per participant
Functional Family Therapy 
for youth on probation (FFT)
Multi-Systemic Therapy 
(MST)
Multidimensional Treatment Foster 
Care (v. regular group care) (MTFC)126
Aggression Replacement 
Training (ART)
$19,529 
$12,855 
$51,828 
$8,897 
$14,617 
$9,622
$32,915
$6,659
$2,325 
$4,264 
$6,945 
$897 
$12,292 
$5,358 
$25,970 
$5,762
$31,821 
$18,213 
$77,798 
$14,660 
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Chicago, Philadelphia and Boston provide models for
doing this (p.8).
• Place more juveniles who need to be removed from
their homes in intensive foster care homes instead of
custody. Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care (MTFC)
is operated out of 30 sites nationwide (p.9). But many
youth being held in juvenile halls or low- to medium-
level security facilities could be better served by MTFC,
cutting their recidivism in half and saving $77,000 per
youth from reduced crime.
• Place other serious young offenders in court-
ordered family therapy. Functional Family Therapy (FFT)
is operating at 200 sites worldwide, and Multisystemic
Therapy (MST) has over 135 sites in the United States
(p.12). But many more localities should adopt these inter-
ventions that have a proven record of cutting crime and
saving money.
• Whether juveniles are in custody or not, if they
need treatment to control their aggression or substance
abuse problems, ensure they receive interventions that
work. Aggression Replacement Training is used to treat
aggression throughout the United States, but it is still not
routinely available for most youth who need it in the
juvenile justice system (p.11). And while many youth
receive drug treatment through the juvenile justice sys-
tem, many more need it. Those who are receiving treat-
ment are less likely to stay clean unless they receive
active follow-up programs such as the Adolescent
Community Reinforcement Approach (p.14).
• Provide safe alternatives to pre-hearing detention
for most first-time and low-level offenders. Many local-
ities are already saving money by reducing detention
before adjudication (p.15). That money can be re-direct-
ed to interventions for higher-risk juvenile offenders. 
• When juveniles return to their communities follow-
ing custody, ensure they receive the interventions for
aggression, family functioning, or substance abuse and
other supports they will need to stay crime-free. If more
is not done to provide proven interventions to youth
returning from custody, many troubled youth will contin-
ue to be a danger to their community (see p.13 for a
recap of what works).
• Systematically collect juvenile and adult arrest data
and use it to hold programs accountable for reducing
crime. The federal government should do more to
encourage state and local governments to collect and
share data. Effective data collection is just the first step,
however, in building accountability systems that will
hold facilities and programs responsible for reducing
crime (see p.17-18 for Washington and Florida’s exam-
ples).
These recommendations demonstrate the need to use
science, data collection, and accountability to guide pol-
icy. 
The members of Fight Crime: Invest in Kids across
America are committed to federal policies that leverage
changes in the state and local juvenile justice systems
because they know that effective interventions will pro-
duce both huge savings and safer streets.
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Cognitive Behavior Therapies
for aggressive and/or substance abusing individuals: 
Aggression Replacement Training (ART) 
At under $1,000 per young offender, this is a relative-
ly low-cost, 10 week CBT intervention that can be used
fairly widely with many juveniles who have serious
problems with aggression, whether they are on proba-
tion, in custody, or returning to their communities fol-
lowing custody. A test of ART with juvenile delinquents
returning to their communities found that, within 6
months after release, juveniles not receiving ART were
almost 3 times more likely to be re-arrested for a crime
(43 percent vs.15 percent). Young people in Brooklyn
gangs without ART services had 4 times the number of
arrests of similar young gang members receiving ART
(52 percent vs. 13 percent).97 Tests of ART for delin-
quents in custody were also positive.98 For more infor-
mation on this program see: 
http://www.researchpress.com/product/item/5004/ 
Motivational Enhancement Therapy &
Cognitive Behavior Therapy (MET/CBT) 
This intervention is designed for outpatient substance
abuse treatment and uses motivation techniques to first
convince teen substance abusers they need treatment.
Then cognitive behavior therapy is provided to give
juveniles the beliefs and skills they will need to change
their substance abusing behaviors. (Cognitive Behavior
Therapy by itself has been shown to be less effective in
reducing substance abuse.) MET/CBT produces results
in randomized controlled trials that compare favorably
with the results and the benefits per cost of family ther-
apy for substance abuse. For more information on this
program, see: 
http://www.chestnut.org/li/Bookstore/Blurbs/
Manuals/CYT/CYT-v1-MET_CBT.html 
Functional Family Therapy (FFT) 
This family therapy intervention has been successful-
ly used for teens with serious delinquency, aggression
and/or substance abuse problems who present a moder-
ate to high-risk of re-offending. It is delivered over a
period of 8 to 30 hours by trained providers. They range
in background from paraprofessionals to mental health
professionals. It costs $2,000 per juvenile delinquent. In
one study it cut re-arrests in half (26 percent vs. 50 per-
cent) and in another study juveniles in the intervention
were one-fourth as likely to be placed outside their
home in juvenile justice custody, in a psychiatric place-
ment, or in foster care (18 percent vs. 72 percent).99 It
can be used for youth on probation, in lieu of custody,
or as support when youth return to their family after cus-
tody. For more information on this program see:
http://www.fftinc.com/ 
Multisystemic Therapy (MST) 
MST is a family therapy intervention for teens with
moderate to high-risks of re-offending similar to FFT,
though MST often serves some teens who are more seri-
ous or violent offenders than those served by FFT. It
costs over $5,000 for each youth and typically involves
60 hours of professional interventions over four months.
The staff members are on call, if need be, around the
clock. When properly implemented, MST shows strong
results.100 One study followed-up the youth until they
were an average of 29 years old. Individuals who had
not received MST but were randomly assigned to
receive individual therapy instead were 62 percent more
likely to have been arrested for any criminal offense (81
percent vs. 50 percent), more than twice as likely to be
arrested for a violent offense (30 percent vs. 14 percent),
and more than twice as likely to be arrested for a drug
offense (33 percent vs. 13 percent).101 It can also be used
for youth on probation, in lieu of custody, or as support
when youth return to their family after custody. For more
information on this program see:
http://www.mstservices.com/ 
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Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care
This intervention is a longer-term, 6 to 12 month, fam-
ily therapy intervention that can be used for seriously
offending youth who would otherwise be placed out-of-
home in group facilities. It involves carefully selecting
and training foster parents and training them to tightly
manage the youth’s behavior. The youth are also taught to
better control their behaviors. While the youth are in the
foster parents’ custody, their parents or guardian receive
training so they can also tightly manage their child’s
behavior once they return home. It costs $2,500 more
than typical group care. Research shows it successfully
cut the average number of arrests per youth in half (2.6
arrests vs. 5.4 arrests) and six times as many of the boys
in MTFC as boys in a group homes had successfully
avoided any new arrest (41 percent vs. 7 percent).102
MTFC can also be used for youth returning to their com-
munities from custody if they do not have a stable fami-
ly to return to. For more information on this program see:
http://www.mtfc.com/ 
Brief Strategic Family Therapy (BSFT) 
BSFT is a family therapy intervention aimed at reduc-
ing a youth’s drug use and conduct disorder. A random-
ized clinical trial of BSFT found that 66 percent of youth
in BSFT with conduct disorder (defiant and/or delinquent
behavior) showed significant reductions in conduct dis-
order-related problem behaviors, while youth in group
counseling saw no reduction.  Additionally, youth in
BSFT who used drugs were 3.5 times more likely to show
significant reductions in drug use than youth in group
counseling who used drugs.103 For more information on
this program see: 
http://www.brief-strategic-family-therapy.com/bsft
Adolescent Community Reinforcement
Approach (ACRA) 
ACRA is a behavioral and family therapy intervention
for adolescents, which focuses on getting them to change
their environment so they are surrounded with pro-social
activities, instead of activities and friends who lead them
back into drug abuse. A study was conducted of ACRA as
an active effort to follow-up youth who had completed
residential treatment for substance abuse. ACRA was
compared to what usually happens when youth leave a
treatment intervention: they are told to find follow-up
support and are given some phone numbers, but contin-
uing care is not assertively provided to them. Three
months after leaving treatment, youth receiving active
continuing care with ACRA were 68 percent more likely
to abstain from further marijuana use (52 percent vs. 31
percent).104 For more information on this program see: 
http://www.chestnut.org/li/Bookstore/Blurbs/
Manuals/CYT/CYT-v4-ACRA.html 
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